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INTRODUCTION
Shareholder participation in corporate governance and investor
activism are topics du jour in the United States and around the world. In
the early part of the 20th century, Professors Berle and Means considered
that shareholder participation was impossible in the transformed
commercial world that they described in The Modern Corporation and
Private Property.1 This was a world characterized by dispersed and
vulnerable shareholders, in which owners do not manage, and managers
do not own, the corporation.2 In such an environment, the goal of corporate
law became one of protecting shareholder interests rather than providing
shareholders with participation rights.
The structure of capital markets and profile of shareholders in the
United States today is dramatically different from that time. The rise of
institutional investors challenged the idea that the only possible paradigm
in corporate law is one of shareholder protection. Shareholder
participation in corporate governance is not only feasible but a
contemporary reality.3
As this Article demonstrates, however, there are competing
narratives about shareholders and their right to participate in corporate
governance around the world. Although a negative view underpins much
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Tim Bowley, Ron Masulis, Catherine McCall, Frank Partnoy, and Randall Thomas for helpful
references and suggestions in relation to this paper. Thanks also to Alan Ngo and Mitheran Selvendran
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1. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
2. Id. at x.
3. See Jennifer G. Hill, The Trajectory of American Corporate Governance: Shareholder
Empowerment and Private Ordering Combat 31–34 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
343, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921692 [https://perma.cc/K36QLA7Y].
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recent debate in the United States, a diametrically opposite view of
shareholder power and activism has gained traction in many jurisdictions
outside the United States.4 This Article focuses on one manifestation of
this positive view of shareholders, namely shareholder stewardship codes,
which originated in the United Kingdom following the 2007–2008 global
financial crisis and are now proliferating throughout the world.5
These competing narratives concerning the role of shareholders in
corporate governance have significant regulatory implications. In
particular, the narratives pose challenges to regulators, who attempt to
differentiate between “good activists” and “bad activists.”
I.
EVOLVING OWNERSHIP PATTERNS AND COMPETING
NARRATIVES CONCERNING SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
Ownership patterns in the United States today are very different from
those when Berle and Means wrote The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, in which they depicted shareholders as a dispersed group
requiring legal protection due to their inability to act collectively.6 By the
1990s, shareholder engagement in corporate governance and activism had
become feasible7 given the rise of powerful institutional investors.8 The
subsequent emergence of hedge funds revealed the possibility of new
activist techniques and strategies.9
4. See generally Jennifer G. Hill, Images of the Shareholder–Shareholder Power and
Shareholder Powerlessness, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 53–57 (Jennifer G.
Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015).
5. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 31–32 (2015) [hereinafter OECD 2015]; Ruth Sullivan, UK Seen as Model for
Stewardship Guidelines, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2010), https://www.ft.com/content/0e0bbc50-9c0211df-a7a4-00144feab49a.
6. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 78. This ever-widening shareholder dispersion increased
the danger of entrenched managerial power, effectively creating “ownerless corporations.” See
Andrew G. Haldane, Chief Economist, Bank of Eng., Speech “Who Owns A Company?” given at
University of Edinburgh Corporate Finance Conference 8, 11 (May 22, 2015), http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2015/speech833.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H67CJYB].
7. Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the
Hermes UK Focus Fund, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3093, 3119–21 (2009); Bernard S. Black & John C.
Coffee Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behaviour Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 1997, 2001–07 (1994); Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder
Activism in the United States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55 (2007).
8. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 572–74 (1990).
9. William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1401–10
(2007); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 63 J.
FIN. 1729, 1745–46 (2008); Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present and Future of
Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 60–61 (2011); Marcel Kahan & Edward B.
Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1029–
43 (2007).
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Today, financial institutions dominate the capital markets in many,
but by no means all,10 jurisdictions. In the United States, for example,
institutional investor shareholding in the top 1,000 U.S. corporations,
which stood at less than ten percent in the early 1950s, has now risen to
over seventy percent.11 This pattern is even more pronounced in the United
Kingdom, where around ninety percent of shares are held by financial
institutions, approximately half of which are non-U.K.-based.12 There has
also been massive growth in financial intermediation in Australia as a
result of the introduction of a mandatory private pension (superannuation)
system in the early 1990s, with Australian fund managers responsible for
a fund pool of approximately A$3 trillion.13 There have been analogous
developments in major Asian financial centers, such as Hong Kong and
Singapore.14
10. In parts of Asia, for example, concentrated ownership, such as state-, family- or founderowned companies, continues to be the dominant paradigm. There are also high levels of share trading
by individuals. In Taiwan, for example, more than sixty percent of share trading is conducted by
individuals, as opposed to institutional, investors. Christopher Chen, Taiwan, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN ASIA (Bruce E. Aronson & Joongi Kim eds., forthcoming 2018).
11. Robert B. Thompson, The Power of Shareholders in the United States, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 441, 447 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015);
Suneela Jain et al., The Conference Board Governance Center White Paper: What is the Optimal
Balance in the Relative Roles of Management, Directors, and Investors in the Governance of Public
Corporations? 9 (2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://tcbblogs.org/public_html/wp-content/
uploads/The%20Conference%20Board%20Governance%20Center%20White%20Paper.pdf.
12. Paul Davies, Shareholders in the United Kingdom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
SHAREHOLDER POWER 355, 356 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015). On the changing
nature of the U.K. shareholder structure, see generally ENERGY AND INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY
COMMITTEE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THIRD REPORT OF SESSION 2016–17, HC 702, §§ 13–16
(UK),
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmbeis/702/702.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/Y5BK-CUYJ]; see also Haldane, supra note 6, at 11 (noting that the fraction of shares held
by individuals in the United Kingdom has dropped from around fifty percent in the 1960s to a little
over ten percent today, and most of those individual holdings are now indirectly held through financial
intermediaries). Ownership of shares by foreign investors is even higher in some other European
jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, where it has been estimated that foreign investors own over
seventy percent of the equity market. See Sullivan, supra note 5.
13. See, e.g., Press Release, Fin. Servs. Council, FSC Launches Internal Governance and Asset
Stewardship Standard (July 19, 2017), https://www.fsc.org.au/_entity/annotation/86955911-0f6ce711-8103-c4346bc5c274 [https://perma.cc/P5W2-2N3G]; AUSTL. GOV’T TREASURY, FINANCIAL
SYSTEMS INQUIRY FINAL REPORT § 2 (2014), http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final_Report_
Consolidated20141210.pdf [https://perma.cc/27Z5-UAXZ].
14. See Ernest Lim & Luh Luh Lan, The Role of Institutional Investors in Singapore and Hong
Kong: Stewardship Codes and Ownership Engagement (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the
Corporate Governance and Regulation: East Meets West Conference at the Univ. of Sydney (Aug.
17–18, 2017)). Professors Lim and Lan note that between 2007 and 2017, the number of mutual funds
domiciled in Singapore and Hong Kong rose from 86 to 197 (Singapore) and from 61 to 323 (Hong
Kong). Id. During the same period, assets under management of domiciled funds in each jurisdiction
grew from $10 billion to $30 billion (Singapore) and from $19 billion to $92.4 billion (Hong Kong).
Id. Nonetheless, many Asian markets, including Hong Kong, are dominated by family- and state-
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These major capital market shifts, which Professors Gilson and
Gordon have labeled “agency capitalism,” have important implications for
investor activism and regulation.15 According to Gilson and Gordon, a
feature of contemporary agency capitalism is that institutional investors
are “sophisticated but reticent.”16 This means that, although these financial
institutions are unlikely to initiate activist conduct, other more aggressive
market players, such as hedge funds, may persuade them to join forces and
engage in such conduct.17
As the profile of shareholders has changed, so too has their image,
which has become increasingly ambiguous, particularly since the global
financial crisis. Two competing narratives are apparent in current
comparative corporate governance—these are the narratives of the “bad
activist” versus the “good activist.”
a.

The Negative Narrative

A negative perception of investors, or at least certain types of
investors, pervades much of the contemporary U.S. debate concerning the
role of shareholders in corporate governance. This narrative portrays some
shareholders as unfaithful participants in the corporate enterprise.18 Time
horizons play a significant role in the negative narrative, which also
suggests that many investors are myopic and prone to destructive shorttermism.19 Proxy advisers are often tarred with the same brush.20
According to Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, and Katz, for example, hedge fund

owned companies. See John Kong Shan Ho, Bringing Responsible Ownership to the Financial Market
of Hong Kong: How Effective Could It Be?, 16 J. CORP. L. STUD. 437, 446–52 (2016).
15. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Agency Capitalism: Further Implications of Equity
Intermediation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 32 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall
S. Thomas eds., 2015).
16. Id. at 33.
17. Id.
18. They are variously portrayed as predatory, disloyal, or both, to their ultimate beneficiaries.
See generally Hill, supra note 4.
19. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 790–92 (2015); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Protect
Industry from Predatory Speculators, FIN. TIMES (July 8, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/
fac881b6-6be5-11de-9320-00144feabdc0. The idea that activist shareholders are myopic and shorttermist has exerted an increasingly powerful influence in U.S. corporate law literature. For a discussion
of this literature, see generally Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1093–96 (2015). For a recent challenge to the widely held view that the
ideal shareholder is therefore a long-term investor, see Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Myth of the Ideal
Investor, 41 SEATTLE. U. L. REV. 425 (2018).
20. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction
to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 484 (2014).
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activists are “profoundly destructive to the long-term health of companies
and the American economy.”21
This view of shareholders gained ground as a result of the global
financial crisis. Some commentators suggested, for example, that
shareholders were “more instigators than victims” of flawed executive
compensation schemes that prompted corporate managers to engage in
excessive risk-taking.22 The negative narrative of investors has also been
an influential theme in the U.S. shareholder empowerment and proxy
access debates.23
This negative perception of investors has important regulatory
implications. It suggests that investor engagement in corporate governance
and activism is dangerous, both to the corporation and to society as a
whole. It flips the traditional Berle–Means goal of protecting shareholders
on its head by suggesting that the modern goal of corporate law should be
to protect the corporation from certain investors. A clear example of this
approach is Martin Lipton’s recommendation that any new U.S. legislation
or regulation should include protection for companies against shareholder
pressure.24
The negative narrative of shareholders is by no means restricted to
the United States. In Germany in 2005, following the ouster of Werner G.
Seifert from his position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the German
Stock Exchange, short-term shareholders, such as hedge funds, were
described as “swarms of locusts.”25 In 2008, a senior member of Japan’s
21. See Martin Lipton, Do Activist Hedge Funds Really Create Long-Term Value?, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 22, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2014/07/22/do-activist-hedge-funds-really-create-long-term-value/ [https://perma.cc/N5TU-JEPS].
22. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 799 (2011).
23. See Hill, supra note 3; Jennifer G. Hill, The Rising Tension Between Shareholder and
Director Power in the Common Law World, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 344 (2010).
24. Martin Lipton, Will a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance Bring Peace to the Thirty
Years’ War, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 2, 2015), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2015/10/05/will-a-new-paradigm-for-corporate-governance-bring-peace/
[https://
perma.cc/LV93-CAJD].
25. See Franz Müntefering, Chairman of the Soc. Democratic Party, Speech “Freiheit und
Verantwortung” at Friedrich Ebert Found. in Berlin (Nov. 19, 2004), http://www.franzmuentefering.de/reden/pdf/19.11.04.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4B9-RF39]; Mark Landler & Heather
Timmons, Poison Ink Aimed at ‘Locusts,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/03/31/business/media/poison-ink-aimed-at-locusts.html. The “swarms of locusts” metaphor is
reminiscent of references in the U.S. context to hedge funds as “wolf packs.” E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr.
& Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance,
41 J. CORP. L. 545, 562–68 (2016); Carmen X. W. Lu, Unpacking Wolf Packs, 125 YALE L.J. 773,
773–77 (2016); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective
on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1871–
908 (2017).
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Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) described shareholders
as greedy, “fickle,” and “irresponsible,” expecting high dividends while
simultaneously shirking responsibility.26 In Korea, corporate law
amendments in 2007 imposed criminal sanctions on foreign investors
seeking to exert an “influence on control” of Korean firms, and this
concept extended to shareholder demands for higher dividends.27 In 2015,
an ultimately unsuccessful attempt by U.S. hedge fund Elliott
Management to block a family-controlled acquisition of Samsung C&T in
Korea provoked an anti-Semitic response, which was a shocking and
extreme example of the view of foreign investors as predatory.28
Recent activist demands made against companies in the Asia-Pacific
region have been variously described as bullying and short-termist,29
dangerous to the industry, and attempting to manipulate the markets.30 In

26. These comments were made in response to pressure by the activist U.S. investment fund
Steel Partners against the managers of Sapporo, a Japanese beer company, in which Steel Partners had
a 19% stake. Activist Investors in Japan: Samurai v Shareholders, ECONOMIST (Feb. 14, 2008),
http://www.economist.com/node/10698467 [https://perma.cc/J658-MGGA]. For discussion of
subsequent difficulties experienced by Steel Partners in seeking to replace many of Sapporo’s
directors, see Michiyo Nakamoto, Steel Partners Dealt Fresh Setback in Japan, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 30,
2010), https://www.ft.com/content/d4322b14-3bd9-11df-9412-00144feabdc0.
27. Kon Sik Kim, Dynamics of Shareholder Power in Korea, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
SHAREHOLDER POWER 535, 540 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015).
28. See Ken Kurson, Samsung Reacts to Observer, Deletes Anti-Semitic ‘Vulture Man’ Cartoons,
OBSERVER (July 15, 2015, 12:55 PM), http://observer.com/2015/07/breaking-samsung-reacts-toobserver-deletes-anti-semitic-vulture-man-cartoons/ [https://perma.cc/4TSZ-B6L5].
29. For example, Hong Kong’s Bank of East Asia, which was the target of an activist campaign
by Elliott Management, accused the hedge fund of “bullying tactics [that] only seek to serve their own
short-term interests, and not the interests of the bank’s shareholders as a whole.” Alun John, What is
Bank of East Asia and Elliott’s Dispute About?, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 18, 2017),
http://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/2103138/what-bank-east-asia-and-elliottsdispute-about [https://perma.cc/Y4KD-KWHH]; see also Mia Lamar, Hedge Fund Elliott Calls on
Bank of East Asia to Sell, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-elliottcalls-on-bank-of-east-asia-to-sell-1454575546. Similarly, the general manager of a venerable
Japanese company, Katakura Industries Co., described the suggestions of a Hong Kong-based activist
hedge, Oasis Management Co., fund as “extremely short-term.” Lisa Pham, Activist Hedge Fund
Battles 144-Year-Old Firm to Ditch Low-Return Ventures, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 4, 2017),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/04/04/business/corporate-business/activist-hedge-fundbattles-144-year-old-firm-ditch-low-return-ventures/ [https://perma.cc/VS3S-D24C].
30. The actor George Clooney entered into debate about the activist campaign by Daniel S. Loeb
against the Japanese company Sony, describing Mr. Loeb as a “carpet bagger” who was dangerous to
the industry and trying to manipulate the market. Michael J. de la Merced, George Clooney Rebuts
Loeb’s Critique of Sony, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 2, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/08/02/george-clooney-rebuts-loebs-critique-of-sony/ [https://perma.cc/Z7AX-63MX]; see
Nathan Vardi, George Clooney Attacks Hedge Fund Billionaire Dan Loeb, FORBES (Aug. 2, 2013),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/08/02/george-clooney-attacks-hedge-fundbillionaire-dan-loeb/ [https://perma.cc/E5JS-RG9G].
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the case of Elliott Management’s “brazen foray”31 against mining
company BHP Billiton Ltd.,32 Australia’s Treasurer, Scott Morrison,
weighed in on the debate, stating that one of Elliott Management’s
demands33 would amount to a criminal offense and be contrary to the
national interest.34
b.

The Positive Narrative

There is, however, a powerful alternative narrative about shareholder
activism in modern comparative corporate governance. This narrative,
which is common outside the United States, views increased shareholder
power and engagement in corporate governance in a distinctly positive
light. According to this analysis, the problem during the global financial
crisis was not too much shareholder pressure on management but too little.
As John Plender lamented in relation to the crisis, “where were the
shareholders?”35
Comments made in 2015 by Andy Haldane, Chief Economist at the
Bank of England, reveal a positive narrative of shareholder engagement.
According to Mr. Haldane:
31. John Kehoe, Elliott’s BHP Billiton Hit Shows Activist Hedge Funds Target Australia, AUSTL.
FIN. REV. (Apr. 18, 2017), http://www.afr.com/business/elliotts-bhp-billiton-hit-shows-activisthedge-funds-target-australia-20170416-gvlq3c [https://perma.cc/F2YZ-N64W]. The CEO of BHP
Billiton Ltd. described Elliott Management’s activist campaign against his company as “crude
financial engineering.” Id.
32. Prior to Elliott Management’s campaign against BHP Billiton Ltd., shareholder activism in
Australia had generally been limited to homegrown activist institutions, which tended to target small
to medium companies for poor performance or corporate governance practices. Id.
33. Namely, Elliott Management’s demand that BHP Billiton Ltd. collapse its dual British–
Australian listing and to eliminate its listing on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). See Press
Release, Hon. Scott Morrison MP, Treasurer of Austl.,Treasurer’s Statement on Elliott’s BHP
Proposal (May 4, 2017), http://sjm.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/041-2017/ [https://
perma.cc/A2YP-Q2PL].
34. See id. According to the Treasurer, it would be “unthinkable that any Australian Government
could allow this original Big Australian to head offshore.” The rationale for Mr. Morrison’s claim that
this would also be illegal was the fact that in 2001 one of the protective conditions that the thenTreasurer of Australia, Peter Costello, imposed in agreeing to a merger between BHP Ltd. and Billiton
Plc. was that BHP Billiton Ltd. should remain listed on the ASX. According to Mr. Morrison, if BHP
Billiton Ltd. were to implement Elliott Management’s demands contrary to the 2001 condition, this
could constitute a criminal offence under Australia’s Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act of 1975,
exposing both BHP Billiton Ltd. and its directors to liability. Following the comments by the
Treasurer, Elliott Management proposed a new plan under which the dual listing would be collapsed
into an Australian-listed, rather than a UK-listed, company. See Matthew Stevens, Opinion, Elliott’s
BHP Billiton Assault Takes a Toxic Turn, AUSTL. FIN. REV. (May 16, 2017),
http://www.afr.com/business/elliotts-bhp-assault-takes-a-toxic-turn-20170516-gw650n
[https://perma.cc/KUC9-M74Y].
35. John Plender, Shut Out, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/fac648d69c76-11dd-a42e-000077b07658.
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One consequence of a more dispersed and disinterested
ownership structure is that it becomes harder to exert
influence over management, increasing the risk of suboptimal decision-making. There is some empirical support
for this hypothesis. For example, companies tend to have
higher valuations when institutional shareholders are a large
share of cashflow, perhaps reflecting their stewardship role
in protecting the firm from excessive risk-taking.36

A positive view of shareholder engagement also underpinned several
recommendations of the 2012 U.K. Kay Review,37 which was established
to review the impact of activity in U.K. equity markets on the long-term
performance and governance of U.K. listed companies.38 Although the
Kay Review concluded that short-termism was indeed a problem in U.K.
equity markets,39 it also considered that increased shareholder engagement
and collective action constituted one of the potential solutions to that
problem. Specifically, the Kay Review recommended establishing an
“investors’ forum”40 to promote enhanced collective engagement by
institutional shareholders and to serve as a contact point between a
company and its main shareholders for discussions of issues such as the
appointment of a chairman and non-executive directors.41 This approach
to shareholder engagement is also supported by the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) under its Principles of
Corporate Governance.42
This positive narrative treats investors as having an important
participatory role in corporate governance, which is integral to
36. Haldane, supra note 6, at 11. Similarly, Denmark’s Minister for Business and Growth, Troels
Lund Poulsen, has spoken positively about increased shareholder engagement in corporate
governance, stating “[i]t benefits Danish competitiveness if institutional investors use their influence
and skills to help Danish companies operate in the best possible way.” Rachel Fixsen, Denmark to
Draft Scheme Inspired by UK’s Stewardship Code, INVS. & PENSIONS EUR. (Jan. 28, 2016),
https://www.ipe.com/news/esg/denmark-to-draft-scheme-inspired-by-uks-stewardship-code/
10011667.fullarticle [https://perma.cc/5MBU-VZVM]. In accordance with this viewpoint, Ashley
Alder, Chief Executive Officer of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission and Chairman
of IOSCO, has raised concerns about the disproportionate growth of passive investment funds, which
may have little interest in holding boards accountable. See John Sedgwick, Hong Kong Warns on
Passive Governance Standards, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/
ffb3b86c-096c-11e7-97d1-5e720a26771b.
37. THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG TERM DECISION-MAKING, FINAL
REPORT (July 2012), http://www.ecgi.org/conferences/eu_actionplan2013/documents/kay_review_
final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8ZX-RLJ8].
38. Id. at 9.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 9, 13, 50–51.
41. Id. at 63.
42. OECD 2015, supra note 5.
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accountability. It supports a radically different regulatory response to its
negative counterpart, suggesting that shareholders should be granted
stronger rights, encouraged to make greater use of their existing powers to
engage with the companies in which they invest, or both.43
The positive narrative underpins several post-crisis reforms44 that
harness increased shareholder engagement as a regulatory technique in its
own right.45 One prominent example of this trend is “say on pay,” which
became a popular regulatory technique around the world following the
crisis.46 An advisory vote by shareholders on remuneration was introduced
in the United States for the first time under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.47
In jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Australia, which already
had a non-binding “say on pay” vote for shareholders, the crisis led to a
strengthening of shareholders’ power in relation to executive pay. In the
United Kingdom, shareholders now have an additional binding vote on
remuneration policies.48 In 2011, Australia introduced a distinctive form
of “say on pay,” the so-called “two strikes” rule.49 Under this rule, a listed
corporation that suffers two consecutive “strikes”—namely shareholder
“no” votes of twenty-five percent or more on the annual directors’
remuneration report—must put a “spill resolution” to its shareholders. If
successful, this resolution requires all board members to submit to
reelection by the company’s shareholders within ninety days.50 In Europe,
the revised Shareholders’ Rights Directive grants shareholders an ex ante

43. See generally Hill, supra note 4.
44. Some scholars have strongly criticized these reforms on the basis that they themselves
constitute a kind of regulatory myopia. See, e.g., Alan J. Dignam, The Future of Shareholder
Democracy in the Shadow of the Financial Crisis, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 639, 684 (2013) (referring
to the myth of the good shareholder); see also Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform
in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309, 310 (2011). According to Professor Bruner, “[I]t is surprising
that policymakers . . . would seek to empower the very stakeholder group whose incentives are most
skewed toward the kind of excessive risk-taking that led to the crisis in the first place.” Id.
45. See Hill, supra note 4, at 64–68.
46. See Roberto Barontini et al., Directors’ Remuneration Before and After the Crisis:
Measuring the Impact of Reforms in Europe, in BOARDS AND SHAREHOLDERS IN EUROPEAN LISTED
COMPANIES: FACTS, CONTEXT AND POST-CRISIS REFORMS 251 (Massimo Belcredi & Guido Ferrarini
eds., 2013). See generally Randall S. Thomas & Christoph Van Der Elst, Say on Pay Around the
World, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 653 (2015).
47. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
48. See Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, 2013 c. 24, § 6 (UK); see also DEP’T FOR
BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS, DIRS.’ REMUNERATION REFORMS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 4
(2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/158048/13727-directors-remuneration-reforms-faq.pdf [https://perma.cc/23T3-E6XG].
49. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 250U–250W (Austl.).
50. See Hill, supra note 4, at 66–68.
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vote on remuneration policy, which is in principle binding, and an ex post
advisory vote on the remuneration report for the prior year. 51
II.

THE RISE AND RISE OF STEWARDSHIP CODES

Perhaps the clearest example of the influence of the positive narrative
in comparative corporate governance, however, is the rise of stewardship
codes, which first appeared in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
These codes indicate that, in some jurisdictions at least, the debate today
is less about controlling shareholder power than about constraining board
power by encouraging shareholders to exercise their legal rights and
increase their level of engagement in corporate governance.52 Stewardship
codes reflect the view that engagement by institutional investors is an
integral part of any corporate governance system.53 They represent a
generalized regulatory response to John Plender’s global financial crisis
lament—“where were the shareholders?”54
In 2010, the United Kingdom became the first jurisdiction to adopt a
stewardship code,55 following a recommendation of the 2009 Walker
Review on corporate governance in financial institutions.56 A revised
version of the Code, which operates on a voluntary basis, was released in
2012.57 The U.K. Stewardship Code made large claims, asserting, for
example, that “the goal of stewardship is to promote the long term success
51. See Press Release, Eur. Comm. - Fact Sheet, Shareholders’ Rights Directive Q&A (Mar. 14,
2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-592_en.htm [https://perma.cc/FW4Y-H4H6].
52. Some stewardship codes, however, also include as part of their policy rationale the goal of
strengthening the accountability of institutional investors or ensuring that institutional investors fulfill
their fiduciary duty to their own investors and beneficiaries. See, e.g., MINORITY S’HOLDER
WATCHDOG GRP., MALAYSIAN CODE FOR INST. INV’R (2014) [hereinafter MSWG CODE],
https://www.mswg.org.my/the-malaysian-code-for-institutional-investors [https://perma.cc/FDA2ZZUK]; TAIWAN STOCK EXCHANGE, STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR INST. INV’R 2 (June 30, 2016)
[hereinafter TWSE 2016], http://cgc.twse.com.tw/static/stewardship_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BY3BUFQ].
53. In South Africa, for example, it has been claimed that the introduction of a stewardship code,
the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa (CRISA), was a response to recognition that “there
was a huge gap in the governance system because it failed to include institutional investors.” Nina
Röhrbein, The Engaged Investor: The South African Code, INV. & PENSIONS EUR. (Feb. 2011),
https://www.ipe.com/the-engaged-investor-the-south-african-code/38951.fullarticle
[https://perma.cc/4L6A-QL56].
54. See Plender, supra note 35.
55. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE U.K. STEWARDSHIP CODE (July 2010).
56. WALKER REVIEW, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS, NATIONAL ARCHIVES UK (Nov. 26,
2009),
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_
review_261109.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G5X-X2HV].
57. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE U.K. STEWARDSHIP CODE (Sept. 2012) [hereinafter U.K.
STEWARDSHIP
2012],
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b6033d24b2f62c5f/UK-Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf [https://perma.cc/574N-3X5K].
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of companies”58 and that “[e]ffective stewardship benefits companies,
investors, and the economy as a whole.”59
These claims proved alluring from a comparativist standpoint,
providing clear incentives for transplantation.60 Japan became an early
adopter when, in 2014, it introduced its own version of the stewardship
code. Many countries, particularly in Asia, have now jumped on the stewardship code bandwagon.61
The stewardship codes around the world emanate from different
issuing bodies, and this can influence the effectiveness of a code.62 There
are at least three distinct categories of stewardship code. The first category
comprises codes that have been issued by regulators or quasi-regulators on
behalf of the government. Jurisdictions with stewardship codes of this type
include: Denmark,63 Hong Kong,64 Kenya,65 Japan,66 Malaysia,67

58. Id. at 1.
59. Id.
60. According to Professor Edward Rock, the allure of comparativism lies in the idea that “one
can fruitfully transplant legal rules or institutions from one system to another . . . . The temptation is
to try to get something for nothing, or at least at a discount.” Edward B. Rock, America’s Shifting
Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 368 (1996).
61. See EY, Q&A ON STEWARDSHIP CODES 2 (Aug. 2017), http://www.ey.com/Publication/
vwLUAssets/ey-stewardship-codes-august-2017/$FILE/ey-stewardship-codes-august-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MVZ6-UYV6]; OECD 2015, supra note 5, at 29–30; Sullivan 2010, supra note 5.
62. Lim & Lan, supra note 14.
63. See COMM. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, STEWARDSHIP CODE (Nov. 29, 2016) (Den.), https://
corporategovernance.dk/sites/default/files/erst_247_opsaetning_af_anbefalinger_for_aktivt_ejerskab
_uk_2k8.pdf [https://perma.cc/V69D-B7VH].
64. SECS. & FUTURES COMM’N, PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBLE OWNERSHIP (Mar. 7, 2016) (H.K.),
http://cgc.twse.com.tw/static/20160630/0000000054a7dce70155a09e021f001c_Stewardship
%20Principles%20for%20Institutional%20Investors-20160630.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5Q2-MSLQ];
see Kong Shan Ho, supra note 14, at 449 (noting that unlike western markets with dispersed
ownership, the Hong Kong market is dominated by family-owned and state-owned companies,
meaning that it may be more productive for investors to engage directly with controlling shareholders,
rather than the board of directors); see also Lim & Lan, supra note 14 (highlighting differences
between the powers of the regulatory authorities responsible for the U.K. Stewardship Code and Hong
Kong’s Principles of Responsible Ownership).
65. See The Capital Markets Act, No. 6016 (2017) KENYA GAZETTE No. 81 Cap. 485A (Kenya),
http://kenyalaw.org/kenya_gazette/gazette/volume/MTUwOA--/Vol.CXIX-No.81 [https://perma.cc/
NR3U-L34Q].
66. See COUNCIL OF EXPERTS ON JAPAN’S STEWARDSHIP CODE, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE
INVESTORS: JAPAN’S STEWARDSHIP CODE 1–2 (Feb. 26, 2014) [hereinafter JAPAN STEWARDSHIP],
http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/20140407/01.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALN5-T49C].
67. See MSWG CODE, supra note 52.
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Taiwan,68 and Thailand.69 In March 2017, the Insurance Regulatory and
Development Authority (IRDA) became the first Indian regulator to
promulgate such a code with the release of a draft mandatory Stewardship
Code for insurance companies.70 It is anticipated that this is the first step
in the formulation of a generalized set of shareholder stewardship
principles by a coalition of Indian regulators.71
A second category of stewardship codes, operating in some other
countries, are those that have been initiated by various private industry
participants.72 South Korea is an interesting example of this type of code.73
Although the South Korean regulator74 sought to introduce its own
stewardship code in 2015,75 this attempt failed due to strong opposition
from members of the business community, who claimed that such a code
would diminish their autonomy and permit excessive interference in
corporate management by institutional investors.76 However, a private
organization77 subsequently intervened and successfully steered a
voluntary stewardship code to adoption in December 2016.78 Other
68. See TWSE 2016, supra note 52; Taiwan Stock Exchange Launches Stewardship Principles
for Institutional Investors, MONDOVISIONE (July 7, 2016), http://www.mondovisione.com/media-andresources/news/taiwan-stock-exchange-launches-stewardship-principles-for-institutional-investor/
[https://perma.cc/D42C-T4NN].
69. See SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE CODE: I CODE FOR INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS (No. AorSorPor, 39/2559) (2017) (Thai.), http://www.sec.or.th/TH/Documents/hearing/
hearing_39_2559_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JSW-ATDA].
70. See Inst. Inv’r Advisory Servs., Stewardship Code for India – IRDA Intensifies the Agenda
(Mar. 24, 2017) (India), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/91c61f_b117c052c5ba4541b104f3569e3a
e352.pdf [https://perma.cc/WAB3-CRNR].
71. The coalition of Indian regulators comprises the Securities and Exchange Board of India
(Sebi); IRDA; and the Pension Fund Regulatory Development Authority. See Jayshree P. Upadhyay,
India to Draft Rules for Institutional Investors Voting on Company Matters, LIVEMINT (Mar. 6, 2017),
http://www.livemint.com/Companies/0teJ9go8GQPOOrxuAadTeJ/India-to-draft-rules-forinstitutional-investors-voting-on-c.html [https://perma.cc/8UAX-AEMP].
72. EY, supra note 61, at 2.
73. See Mee-Hyon Lee, Introduction of the Stewardship Code in Korea (unpublished manuscript)
(presented at the Corporate Governance and Regulation: East Meets West Conference at the University
of Sydney on Aug. 17–18, 2017) (providing an overview of Korea’s adoption of its Stewardship Code).
74. Korean Financial Services Commission.
75. Lee, supra note 73.
76. See Jung Suk-Yee, Financial Services Commission Concentrating on Stewardship Code,
BUS. KOREA (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/money/17284-koreanstewardship-code-financial-services-commission-concentrating-stewardship [https://perma.cc/ZTH98RY4].
77. The private organization was the Korea Corporate Governance Service, which was founded
in 2002. Its major founding members were the Korea Exchange, the Korea Financial Investment
Association, the Korea Listed Companies Association, and the KOSDAQ Listed Companies
Association. See Lee 2017, supra note 73, at 1.
78. There is increasing pressure for greater managerial transparency in South Korea as a result
of the Choi Soon-sil scandal, which ultimately led to the 2017 impeachment of President Park Geun-
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jurisdictions to adopt codes promulgated by industry players of this kind
include South Africa79 and Singapore.80
A third type of stewardship code encompasses codes that are initiated
by investors themselves.81 Investor-led codes, which exist in countries
such as Australia,82 Brazil,83 Canada,84 Italy,85 the Netherlands,86 and

hye Park. Id. at 1–2. Although Korea’s Stewardship Code is a private initiative, Korea’s Financial
Services Commission has stated that it will introduce policies that provide incentives for institutional
investors to adopt the code. See Lee Ho-Jeong, FSC Pushes for Adoption of Stewardship Code, KOREA
JOONGANG DAILY (Feb. 14, 2017), http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.
aspx?aid=3029833 [https://perma.cc/8BGL-Q5CX].
79. See INST. DIRS. S. AFR., CODE FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTING IN SOUTH AFRICA 2011,
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.iodsa.co.za/resource/resmgr/crisa/crisa_19_july_2011.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/FP26-QXTR].
80. The Singapore Stewardship Principles were issued through the Stewardship Asia Centre
(SAC). In fact, the Singapore Stewardship Principles straddle all three categories of issuing body
because the SAC includes both industry players and investment organizations and was established
under the auspices of Temasek, Singapore’s state-owned sovereign wealth fund. See generally Lim &
Lam, supra note 14. There is no signatory requirement or “comply or explain” requirement under the
Singapore Stewardship Principles. Id.
81. See generally EY, supra note 61, at 2.
82. See, e.g., Fin. Servs. Council, supra note 13. Australia’s Financial Services Council (FSC)
released its FSC Standard 23: Principles of Internal Governance and Asset Stewardship in July 2017.
Compliance with the code is mandatory for all FSC asset-manager members. This applies to
approximately fifty funds management firms, which manage most of the A$2.8 trillion in funds under
management in Australia. The code is voluntary for FSC members that outsource investment
management decisions. See Zilla Efrat, FSC Launches Asset Stewardship Code, INV. MAG. (July 19,
2017), https://investmentmagazine.com.au/2017/07/fsc-launches-asset-stewardship-code/ [https://
perma.cc/4PSE-MG5U].
83. ASSOCIAÇÃO DE INVESITDORES NO MERCADO DES CAPITAIS, AMEC STEWARDSHIP CODE
(2016) (Braz.), https://en.amecbrasil.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/amec-apresentacao-CodigoStewardship_ingles.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R5W-A4FD]. The ICGN has described the focus on ESG
integration under Principle 3 of the AMEC Stewardship Code as a particularly progressive feature of
the Brazilian code. See Letter from Erik Breen, Chairman, ICGN Board, to Asscociacao de
Investidores no Mercado de Capitals (AMEC), at 2 (July 2016), https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/
files/ICGN%20response%20to%20AMEC%20stewardship%20code%20consultation%20July%2020
16.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB97-4AGP].
84. CANADIAN COAL. FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, 2017 CCGG STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, (May
2017) (Can.) [hereinafter CCGC 2017], http://admin.yourwebdepartment.com/site/ccgg/assets/pdf/
stewardship_principles_public.pdf [https://perma.cc/T296-ZFNK].
85. See, e.g., ASSOGESTIONI, ITALIAN STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AND VOTING RIGHTS IN LISTED COMPANIES (2016) (It.), https://www.icgn.org/
sites/default/files/Italian%20code.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5C4-DW82].
86. See EUMEDION, BEST PRACTICES FOR ENGAGED SHARE-OWNERSHIP (June 30, 2011)
(Neth.),
https://www.eumedion.nl/en/public/knowledgenetwork/best-practices/best_practicesengaged-share-ownership.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT5B-YWL2].
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Switzerland,87 reflect a strong self-regulatory approach.88 In Canada, for
example, although many public companies have a dominant or controlling
shareholder, institutional investors have been highly influential in
corporate governance matters.89 The Canadian Coalition for Good
Governance (CCGC), which comprises forty-nine of Canada’s largest
institutional investors,90 publishes a set of principles relating to
shareholder monitoring and engagement in investee companies.91
Stewardship codes can sometimes mutate by changing categories. In
the United Kingdom, for example, the 2010 Stewardship Code effected a
species-jump from the third category of investor-led code to the first
category of regulator/quasi-regulator-sanctioned code.92 The 2009 Walker
Review recommended that the U.K. Financial Reporting Council should
ratify an existing investor-led code and transform it into the new
Stewardship Code.93 The Walker Review anticipated that changing the
issuing body would elevate the status of the Stewardship Code to equal
that of the U.K. Combined Code.94 The Walker Review’s clear message
was that regulator/quasi-regulator-sanctioned codes have more clout than
investor-led codes.
Recent developments in the United States fall within the third
category of investor-led codes. In January 2017, the Investor Stewardship
87. In 2013, a group of institutional investors, proxy advisers, and business representatives
adopted a set of stewardship guidelines. See SWISS ASS’N OF PENSION FUND PROVIDERS ET AL.,
GUIDELINES FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS GOVERNING THE EXERCISING OF PARTICIPATION
RIGHTS IN PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANIES (2013) (Switz.), https://www.ethosfund.ch/sites/
default/files/upload/publication/p432e_130121_Guidelines_for_institutional_investors.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X292-67DC]. One of the participants, Ethos, which comprises 228 Swiss pension
funds and tax-exempt institutions, states that its aim is to promote “socially responsible investment
(SRI) as well as a stable and prosperous socio-economic environment that safeguards the interests of
civil society today and in the future.” Id.
88. See, e.g., ASSOGESTIONI, supra note 85.
89. Andrew MacDougall et al., Canada, in THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 77, 78
(Willem J.L. Calkoen ed., 6th ed. 2016). Shareholder engagement and investor activism is also on the
rise in Canadian companies. See id. at 88. There has also been “a growing focus not only by boards
but also long-term active institutional shareholders on the importance of taking a longer-term
perspective and avoiding decisions motivated solely by short-term results.” Id. at 90.
90. Id. at 78.
91. See CCGC 2010, supra note 84.
92. Fin. Reporting Council, supra note 55.
93. See WALKER REVIEW, supra note 56, Recommendations 16 and 17. The investor-led code
appropriated by the U.K. Financial Reporting Council was the Code on the Responsibilities of
Institutional Investors, published by the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (ISC) in November
2009, in response to mounting calls for institutional investors to hold companies to account. However,
the origins of the U.K. Stewardship Code can be traced back even further to The Responsibilities of
Institutional Shareholders and Agents: Statement of Principles, published by the ISC in 2002, and
based upon the ISC’s 1991 statement, The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders in the UK.
94. WALKER REVIEW, supra note 56, Recommendation 17.
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Group (ISG), a coalition of some of the largest U.S.-based and
international asset owners and managers,95 released its Framework for US
Stewardship and Governance.96 The stewardship framework for
institutional investors97 and the corporate governance framework for listed
U.S. companies98 each include a set of six principles. The first tenet of the
corporate governance principles is that “[b]oards are accountable to
shareholders,”99 and the first tenet of the stewardship principles is that
“[i]nstitutional investors are accountable to those whose money they
invest.”100 The corporate governance principles, in particular, send a
strong message about the expectations of institutional investors in U.S.listed companies today. These expectations, which include adoption of a
“one share-one vote” structure, are as follows:101 responsiveness to
institutional investor concerns,102 strong independent board leadership,103
and management incentive structures that promote the company’s longterm strategy.104
Although the ISG framework is voluntary, it has the backing of some
of the world’s largest asset managers, including founding members, such

95. The ISG comprises sixteen founding international institutional investors, which togther
invest more than US$ 17 trillion in U.S. equity markets. See Inv. Stewardship Grp., Corporate
Governance and Stewardship Principles, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/07/corporate-governance-and-stewardshipprinciples/#more-78477 [https://perma.cc/4UBF-WSVR].
96. See Abe M. Friedman, Investor Coalition Publishes US Stewardship Code, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Feb. 9, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/09/
investor-coalition-publishes-u-s-stewardship-code/ [https://perma.cc/4ZNT-H9E4]; see also Amanda
White, Top US Funds Embrace Stewardship Code, TOP 1000 FUNDS.COM (Feb. 17, 2017),
https://www.top1000funds.com/analysis/2017/02/17/top-us-funds-embrace-stewardship-code/
[https://perma.cc/4HME-Y34Q] (describing the adoption of the frameworks on stewardship and
corporate governance in the United States as “long overdue”).
97. See INV. STEWARDSHIP GRP., THE PRINCIPLES: STEWARDSHIP FRAMEWORK FOR
INSITUTIONAL INVESTORS (Jan. 2017) [hereinafter ISG STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES], https://www.
isgframework.org/stewardship-principles/ [https://perma.cc/X8SA-3K6F].
98. See INV. STEWARDSHIP GRP., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR US LISTED
COMPANIES: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR US LISTED COMPANIES (Jan. 31, 2017)
[hereinafter ISG CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES], https://www.isgframework.org/corporategovernance-principles/ [https://perma.cc/F8EY-TFZC].
99. Id. Principle 1.
100. Id. Principle A.
101. See id. Principle 2; cf. Eleanor Bloxham, Snap Shouldn’t Have Been Allowed to Go to the
Public Without Voting Rights, FORTUNE (Mar. 4, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/03/snap-ipo-nonvoting-stock/ [https://perma.cc/2LZN-6R5S] (Snap Inc.’s recent IPO, which included non-voting
shares, was offered to the public).
102. See ISG CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 98, Principle 3.
103. See id. Principle 4.
104. See id. Principle 6.
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as BlackRock, State Street Global Advisors, and Vanguard.105 BlackRock,
in particular, is taking an increasingly active stewardship role on the
international stage. In January 2017, BlackRock, which is estimated to be
one of the top three shareholders in every company listed on the FTSE
index, wrote to the chairmen of over 300 U.K. companies to announce that
it would vote against executive pay increases unless they were linked to
strong and sustainable long-term corporate performance.106 According to
BlackRock, executives should not be rewarded for short-term rises in share
price,107 and should only be granted increases in pay that are
commensurate with increases received by rank-and-file employees.108
BlackRock’s head of corporate governance stated that failure by U.K.
companies to comply with these demands would “call into question the
quality of the board.”109 Several U.K. companies have responded by
reducing CEO pay.110 A corporate governance report of the U.K. House of
Commons in early 2017 described these developments as
“encouraging.”111
A common theme in contemporary international stewardship codes,
regardless of their issuing body, is the need for long-term investment
horizons. As Australia’s Financial Services Council recently stated when
issuing its new Governance and Asset Stewardship Standard, “[g]ood
105. The other thirteen founding members of the ISG are CalSTRS; Florida State Board of
Administration; GIC Private Limited (Singapore’s Sovereign Wealth Fund); Legal and General
Investment Management; MFS Investment Management; MN Netherlands; PGGM, Royal Bank of
Canada Global Asset Management; TIAA Investments; T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.; ValueAct
Capital; Washington State Investment Board; and Wellington Management. Leading Investors Launch
Historic Initiative Focused on U.S. Institutional Investor Stewardship and Corporate Governance,
BUS. WIRE (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170131005949/en/LeadingInvestors-Launch-Historic-Initiative-Focused-U.S [https://perma.cc/X58E-P2HP]; see White, supra
note 96. Interestingly, the ISG Framework for US Stewardship and Governance has the backing not
only of institutional investors but also some activist hedge funds, such as ValueAct Capital and Trian
Partners.
106. See Aimee Donellan & Simon Duke, BlackRock Lays Down the Law to Chairmen, SUNDAY
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2017), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/blackrock-lays-down-the-law-to-chairmen78cssq2lj.
107. Id.
108. See Angela Monaghan, World’s Largest Fund Manager Demands Cuts to Executive Pay
and Bonuses, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jan/15/
blackrock-demands-cuts-to-executive-pay-and-bonuses [https://perma.cc/T8S2-6FKW].
109. Donellan & Duke, supra note 106.
110. Interestingly, the pressure to reduce executive pay has coincided with an increase in female
CEOs. For example, it has been reported that Emma Walmsley, who became CEO of pharmaceutical
giant GlaxoSmithKline in April 2017, will receive a significantly reduced pay package compared to
her predecessor, Sir Andrew Witty. See Sarah Neville, New GSK Boss to be Paid Less Than
Predecessor, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/dca9329c-08cd-11e7-97d15e720a26771b.
111. BUS., ENERGY & INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY COMM., supra note 12, at 24.
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stewardship supports companies with productive use of capital to generate
long-term sustainable returns with the potential for societal gains.”112
III.
THE U.K. AND JAPANESE STEWARDSHIP CODES: SIMILARITIES,
DIFFERENCES, AND REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS
Many of the stewardship codes that now operate around the world
are based on the 2012 U.K. Stewardship Code,113 the 2014 Japanese
Stewardship Code, or both.114 Although these two codes share many
common features, there are also intriguing differences in their approach to
shareholder stewardship.
The U.K. Stewardship Code consists of seven principles115 and operates on a “comply or explain” basis.116 The Code applies primarily to institutional investors and includes both asset owners and asset managers
with equity holdings in U.K. listed companies,117 but it also extends to
service providers such as proxy advisers and investment consultants.118
The adoption of the Stewardship Code represented a shift away from the
112. See Fin. Servs. Council, supra note 13.
113. See U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57.
114. JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66; see OECD 2015, supra note 5, at 29; EY, supra note
61, at 2 ; Sullivan, supra note 5.
115. U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 6–10. Under these principles, institutional
investors should
(1) publicly disclose their policy on how they will discharge their stewardship
responsibilities; (2) have a robust policy on managing conflicts of interest in
relation to stewardship which should be publicly disclosed; (3) monitor their
investee companies; (4) establish clear guidelines on when and how they will
escalate their stewardship activities; (5) be willing to act collectively with other
investors where appropriate; (6) have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of
voting activity; (7) report periodically on their stewardship and voting
activities.
Id. at 5.
116. The “comply or explain” regulatory model derives from the report by the 1992 Committee
on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, in the United
Kingdom. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
STEWARDSHIP 2016, 4 (Jan. 2017), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/ca1d9909-7e32-4894-b2a7b971b4406130/Developments-in-Corporate-Governance-and-Stewardship-2016.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/Z7EK-6YRH]. In the context of the U.K. Stewardship Code, the “comply or explain” model
requires that signatories to the code who choose not to comply with one or more of its principles should
provide “meaningful explanations” for this non-conformity. See U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note
57, at 4.
117. The U.K. Stewardship Code describes “asset owners” as including “pension funds,
insurance companies, investment trusts and other collective investment vehicles”, and states that, as
providers of capital, these institutions “set the tone” for stewardship. “Asset managers” are those
institutions with day-to-day investment management responsibility, and are, according to the Financial
Reporting Council, “well positioned to influence companies’ long-term performance.” U.K.
STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 1.
118. Id. at 2.
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hands-off approach to corporate governance traditionally taken by U.K.
institutional investors.119 The Code is aspirational in nature.120 It states that
institutional investors, as providers of capital, “set the tone” for stewardship.121 One of the Code’s underlying premises is that institutional shareholders have a non-delegable responsibility to engage with the companies
in which they invest.122 This effectively parallels the views of U.S. Justice
Brandeis, who wrote, over a century ago, that it is the shareholder’s “business and his obligation to see that those who represent him carry out a
policy which is consistent with the public welfare”.123
The U.K. Stewardship Code encourages institutional investors to
exercise their stewardship responsibilities in a variety of hands-on ways—
through voting, monitoring, and engaging in “purposeful dialogue” with
companies about matters including strategy, performance, risk and
corporate governance (including culture and executive pay).124 Some
international codes, such as South Africa’s Code for Responsible Investing
(CRISA)125 and the International Corporate Governance Network’s
Global Stewardship Principles,126 go further than the U.K. Code on which

119. Brian R. Cheffins, The Stewardship Code’s Achilles Heel, 73 MOD. L. REV. 1004, 1004–05
(2010).
120. Some scholars, however, have argued that, as a concomitant of their growing power, activist
investors should be subject to strict legal rules analogous to those that apply to directors and company
officers. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn A. Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1255 (2008). However, aspirational standards also play an important role in relation to
directors’ conduct under Delaware law. See, e.g., ); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,
907 A.2d 693,752 (Del. Ch. 2005); Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary
Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 519, 537–38 (2012).
121. U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 1.
122. See U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 2; Kate Burgess, Myners Lashes Out at
Landlord Shareholders, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/c0217c20-2eaf11de-b7d3-00144feabdc0; Jennifer Hughes, FSA Chief Lambasts Uncritical Investors, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 11, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/9edc7548-0e8d-11de-b099-0000779fd2ac.
123. Louis D. Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness, in MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D
BRANDEIS, 75 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1935).
124. U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 1, 6.
125. ESG factors are front and center of CRISA, which is based on the U.K. Stewardship Code.
Principle 1 of CRISA states that “[a]n institutional investor should incorporate sustainability
considerations, including ESG, into its investment analysis and investment activities as part of the
delivery of superior risk-adjusted returns to the ultimate beneficiaries”. See INST. OF DIR. S. AFR.,
supra note 79, Principle 1. The focus on ESG under this Code also reflects the United Nations’s
Principles for Responsible Investment. See id. at 4.
126. See INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, ICGN GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES,
Principle 6 (2016), https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/files/ICGNGlobalStewardshipPrinciples.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HZR9-P77J] (“Promoting long-term value creation and integration of
environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors.”).
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they are modelled127 by emphasizing the role of institutional investors in
promoting environmental, social and governance (ESG) policies.
Despite the U.K. Stewardship Code’s strong claims about its
beneficial qualities,128 not all commentators are equally sanguine. Some
scholars have raised doubts about the Code’s philosophical foundations,129
while others have suggested the Code’s effectiveness may be
compromised by its voluntary “comply or explain” nature.130 Another
possible obstacle to its success is the relatively low level of equity held by
domestic institutional investors in U.K.-listed companies today.131
Notwithstanding these concerns, the proclaimed economic benefits
of the U.K. Stewardship Code were sufficiently tempting to prompt its
transplantation in Japan in 2014, as part of a broad suite of monetary and
fiscal policy reforms adopted by the Abe government.132 The goal of these
reforms, colloquially known as “Abenomics,” was to improve corporate
productivity and “earning power,”133 thereby benefiting the entire

127. See Catherine Howarth, Institutional Investors are the Ghosts at the AGM Feast, FIN. TIMES
(May 15, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/c9c3a6dc-30e4-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a (criticizing the
absence of any reference to oversight of social and environmental risks under the U.K. Stewardship
Code). Note, however, that the U.K. Financial Reporting Council has stated that, as part of its recent
tiering exercise, many signatories to the U.K. Stewardship Code chose to include more information
about ESG matters in their statements, even though the U.K. Code does not explicitly refer to ESG.
See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 116, at 25, 27.
128. U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 1.
129. Professor Alan Dignam has argued, for example, that the stewardship movement is a
dangerous and misguided development because it mischaracterizes shareholders as passive and
blameless in the global financial crisis. See Dignam 2013, supra note 44; see also Bruner 2011, supra
note 44, at 310.
130. Cheffins, supra note 119, at 1013–14; Eva Micheler, Facilitating Investor Engagement and
Stewardship, 14 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 29, 45 (2013); see also Howarth, supra note 127
(complaining that large investors, which still predominantly vote with management, “face no
meaningful sanction” if they fail to act as responsible stewards under the Code).
131. Cheffins, supra note 119, at 115; Davies, supra note 12, at 356. Nonetheless, the Financial
Reporting Council has indicated that it considers the quality and quantity of stewardship to have
improved markedly since the Stewardship Code was introduced in 2010. See FIN. REPORTING
COUNCIL, supra note 116, at 24. In 2016, the Financial Reporting Council placed more pressure on
signatories in relation to their stewardship responsibilities by undertaking a “tiering exercise.” This
exercise publicly ranked U.K. Stewardship Code signatories into three tiers, serving as a means of
encouraging signatories to reaffirm their commitment to stewardship and provide high quality
explanations of their stewardship engagement. See generally id. at 24. According to the Financial
Reporting Council, the number of signatories in the highest ranking, Tier 1, has increased significantly
as a result of the exercise. Id. at 26.
132. See JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66.
133. See Nicholas Benes, Corporate Governance Reform in Japan, ETHICAL BOARDROOM (Apr.
15, 2015), https://ethicalboardroom.com/corporate-governance-reform-in-japan/ [https://perma.cc/
W52X-AT9Q].
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Japanese economy.134 Japan’s Stewardship Code fell within Abenomics’
“third arrow,”135 which included a number of other significant corporate
governance reforms.136 The ultimate policy goal of the “third arrow”
reforms was not solely to benefit shareholders, but to distribute the
rewards of improved profitability to corporate stakeholders generally, via
expanded employment opportunities, increased wages, and higher
dividend payments.137
Contrary to popular Western belief, shareholders in Japan possess
relatively strong legal rights.138 They include statutory rights to alter the
corporate constitution without board consent; to elect directors by majority
vote in both contested and uncontested board elections; and to nominate
directors on the company’s ballot. 139 Although Japan is a civil law
134. See PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET, JAPAN REVITALIZATION STRATEGY 2
(June 2014), https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/honbunEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6TYS-WD27]; Societé Generale, A New Dawn Rising for Japan’s Stocks?, BARRONS (June 4, 2015),
http://www.barrons.com/articles/a-new-dawn-rising-for-japanese-stocks-1433386067.
135. Namely the Japan Revitalization Strategy. The other two arrows for economic revitalization
were (i) aggressive monetary policy; and (ii) flexible fiscal policy, including public works spending.
See Reform in Japan: The Third Arrow, ECONOMIST (June 26, 2014), https://www.economist.com/
news/leaders/21605905-shinzo-abe-has-best-chance-decades-changing-japan-better-he-seems-poised
[https://perma.cc/PGA8-A96F]; see also G20 AUSTL., COMPREHENSIVE GROWTH STRATEGY: JAPAN
2014,
at
2–6
(2014),
http://g20.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/g20_comprehensive_
growth_strategy_japan.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C74-BK2W].
136. These reforms included the introduction of a Corporate Governance Code. See JPX TOKYO
STOCK EXCHANGE, JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, SEEKING SUSTAINABLE CORPORATE
GROWTH AND INCREASED CORPORATE VALUE OVER THE MID-TO LONG-TERM (June 1, 2015),
http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/listing/cg/tvdivq0000008jdy-att/20150513.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/2WRZ-NQX2]. The reforms also sought to increase the number of outside directors. See
Kazuaki Nagata, New Rules are Pushing Japanese Corporations to Tap More Outside Directors,
JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/04/27/reference/
new-rules-pushing-japanese-corporations-tap-outside-directors/ [https://perma.cc/WBJ2-D9AN]. The
reforms also introduced a new stock index, the JPX-Nikkei 400, with entry requirements of superior
profits and governance practices. See JPX-NIKKEI 400, JAPAN EXCH. GRP. (July 29, 2016),
http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/derivatives/products/domestic/jpx-nikkei400options/index.html
[https://perma.cc/VJR3-EE4G]; Corporate Governance in Japan: A Revolution in the Making,
ECONOMIST (May 3, 2014), https://www.economist.com/news/business/21601557-long-lastjapanese-firms-seem-be-coming-under-proper-outside-scrutiny-revolution [https://perma.cc/K78DG9TN]Benes, supra note 133; PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET, supra note 134, at 107.
137. PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET, supra note 134, at 35.
138. See Gen Goto, Legally “Strong” Shareholders of Japan, 3 MICH. BUS. &
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 125 (2014); see also Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance:
The Hidden Problems of Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189 (2000). This
was not always the case. According to Franks et al., in the first half of the 20th century, Japan had
weak legal protection, accompanied by dispersed ownership. However, in the second half of the
century, after World War II, Japan was characterized by strong legal rights and consolidated,
interlocking share ownership. See Julian Franks et al., The Ownership of Japanese Corporations in
the 20th Century, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2580.
139. See generally Goto, supra note 138.
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jurisdiction, these shareholder rights closely parallel those in some
common law jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and
Australia.140 Also, staggered boards are ineffective in these jurisdictions
because shareholders have an absolute right to remove public company
directors from office at any time.141 Many of the statutorily protected
shareholder rights in these jurisdictions are, however, absent, or available
by private ordering (such as in the United States under Delaware law.142
In spite of the existence of strong shareholder rights in Japan,
investor activism there has historically been rare, fraught with difficulty,143
and viewed with suspicion.144 The most significant constraint on
institutional investor activism was the existence of cross-shareholding
(kabushiki mochiai),145 which insulated management from outside
shareholder influence. Some scholars have viewed cross-shareholding as
the functional equivalent of U.S.-style poison pills.146
Japan’s “third arrow” reforms were considered to be revolutionary in
terms of their potential effect on corporate governance and shareholder
activism.147 The Stewardship Code, in particular, deliberately created a
140. See generally Jennifer G. Hill, Subverting Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News Corp’s
Migration to Delaware, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2010) for a discussion of Anglo–Australian shareholder
rights compared to shareholder rights under Delaware law. For a comparative description of
shareholder rights under Canadian law and Delaware law, see MacDougall et al., supra note 89, at 86–
88.
141. The statutory right to remove directors from office by ordinary resolution cannot be altered
in the constitution or by agreement. See Companies Act, 2006 c. 46 § 168(1) (U.K.); Canada Business
Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-44, § 109(1) (Can.); Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O.
1990 c. B. 16, § 122(1) (Ontario); Corporations Act 2001 § 203D (Austl.). A controversial provision
of the UK Corporate Governance Code, Principle B.7.1, further provides that all directors of FTSE
300 companies should be subject to annual election by shareholders. See FIN. REP. COUNCIL, THE UK
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE Principle B.7.1 (Sept. 2014), https://www.frc.org.uk/
getattachment/59a5171d-4163-4fb2-9e9d-daefcd7153b5/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2D4W-BY5T ].
142. See Goto, supra note 138, at 128–39, for a detailed comparative analysis of shareholder
rights in Japan and Delaware.
143. See, e.g., T. Boone Pickens, The Heck With Japanese Business – Texas Entrepreneur Not
Interested in Competing with a Cartel System, SEATTLE TIMES (June 9, 1991), http://community.
seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19910609&slug=1287976.
144. Ben McLannahan, Japan Investors Face UK-Style Financial Code, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 26,
2013), https://www.ft.com/content/b104a886-6e36-11e3-8dff-00144feabdc0.
145. See Goto, supra note 138, at 126, 128.
146. Takaaki Eguchi & Zenichi Shishido, The Future of Japanese Corporate Governance:
Japan’s Internal Governance and Development of Japanese-Style External Governance Through
Engagement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 552, 559–60 (Jennifer G. Hill &
Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015); CURTIS MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM:
WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AROUND THE WORLD 102 (2008); David Skeel, Governance in the Ruins, 122 HARV. L. REV. 696,
707 (2008).
147. Benes, supra note 133; Corporate Governance in Japan, supra note 136.
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“warmer climate” for foreign investors and shareholder activists,148 in
accordance with the view that activism can be beneficial to
underperforming companies.149 Since the introduction of the Code, there
has been a rise in the number of shareholder-initiated proposals,150 and
foreign investors have had an increasing influence on voting results.151
Activism to date has typically been harnessed to end “corporate cashhoarding,” which was prevalent in many Japanese companies.152
The jury is still out on whether the Japanese Stewardship Code will
ultimately achieve its policy objectives. Sign-on to the Japanese
Stewardship Code has been uneven among market participants. Although
more than 150 asset managers have signed on to the Code,153 corporate
pension funds have all but ignored it. Some commentators claim that the
absence of major Japanese companies, such as Toyota, Panasonic and
Sony, from the list of signatories threatens the viability of the Code.154
148. Ben McLannahan, Japanese Reformists Face Challenge Over Shake-Up of Corporate
Governance Laws, FIN. TIMES (May 25, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/e1e9babc-dff7-11e3b709-00144feabdc0; see SADAKAZU OSAKI, NOMURA RES. INST., KEYS TO SUCCESS OF JAPANESE
STEWARDSHIP CODE 5 (July 4, 2014), https://www.nri.com/~/media/PDF/global/opinion/lakyara/
2014/lkr2014199.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5PL-R99F].
149. This view has been expressed in relation to some recent activist shareholder campaigns in
Australia. See, e.g., Tony Boyd, Ardent Board Under Pressure as Shareholders Revolt, AUSTL. FIN.
REV.: CHANTICLEER (July 7, 2017, 6:26 PM), http://www.afr.com/brand/chanticleer/ardent-boardunder-pressure-as-shareholders-revolt-20170706-gx6fkp [https://perma.cc/V7HW-4DS9]. Boyd
described the campaign against Ardent Leisure as “a textbook example of shareholder activism at its
best.” Id.; see also Glenda Korporaal, Gary Weiss’s Ariadne Attacks Ardent Leisure Board, AUSTL.
BUS. REV. (July 7, 2017), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/companies/gary-weisss-ariadneattacks-ardent-leisure-board/news-story/d3e9526d86c8da8dd62a67de2c1c57e2; Tony Boyd, BHP on
Track to Shed Its Chronic Underperformance, AUSTL. FIN. REV.: CHANTICLEER (Aug. 22, 2017),
http://www.afr.com/brand/chanticleer/bhp-on-track-to-shed-its-chronic-underperformance20170822-gy1rno.
150. See Ben McLannahan, Shareholder Activism Extends Reach Across Japanese Boardrooms,
FIN. TIMES (June 23, 2014).
151. See Kenta Kurihara, Japan’s Shareholder Meetings: New Governance Code Ups Pressure
on Management, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (June 9, 2015), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Trends/Newgovernance-code-ups-pressure-on-management [https://perma.cc/78Q3-KDC5].
152. Megumi Fujikawa & Eric Pfanner, In Japan, Dividends, Buybacks Take the Stage:
Shareholders Grow More Active: Companies Respond, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2014),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-japan-dividends-buybacks-take-the-stage-1403711174.
153. See COUNCIL OF EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, JAPAN’S STEWARDSHIP CODE 1 (May 29, 2017), http://www.
fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/20170529/02.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NBA-SJGY] (revised
Stewardship Code with tracked changes from the 2014 version).
154. See Leo Lewis, Secom Breaks Ranks to Highlight Reform Failures of Japan Inc., FIN. TIMES
(May 24, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/3ad40558-3fac-11e7-9d56-25f963e998b2; Leo Lewis,
Companies Fail to Buy into Japan’s Stewardship Code, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/138e73b4-98d3-11e6-8f9b-70e3cabccfae; see also Leo Lewis, Japan’s
Missing Shareholder Activism, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/67599fde1dce-11e7-b7d3-163f5a7f229c (describing Japan’s corporate governance reforms as looking “wobbly
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Recent amendments to the Code are aimed at addressing these and other
concerns about the Code’s effectiveness.155 For example, some of these
new provisions place increased pressure on asset owners themselves to
undertake stewardship, rather than merely relying on asset managers.156
The 2012 U.K. Stewardship Code and its Japanese counterpart share
many common features in terms of regulatory structure, design, and
content. Both Codes are voluntary and regulator-initiated, and both adopt
a principles-based “comply or explain” approach, which, although a
familiar feature of U.K. corporate governance, was entirely new to
Japan.157 The Codes apply to all listed companies in each jurisdiction, and
include not only asset owners and asset managers158 but also proxy
advisers.159 Finally, although recognizing that investors play an important
accountability role, both Codes stress that this does not entitle them to
manage the company’s affairs.160
In spite of these broad similarities, there are also some fundamental
differences between the 2012 U.K. Stewardship Code and the 2014
Japanese Stewardship Code. For a start, they constituted regulatory
of late”); cf. Leo Lewis, Underperforming Companies Face Intense AGM Season, FIN. TIMES (June
25, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/0d3bd186-5972-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b; Leo Lewis,
Japanese Investors’ Pitchfork Moment, FIN. TIMES (June 19, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/88fd8a46-54d4-11e7-9fed-c19e2700005f (suggesting that underperforming Japanese
companies are increasing vulnerable to institutional investors, who are themselves subject to growing
pressure to hold corporate management to account).
155. See generally COUNSEL OF EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 153.
156. See id. Principles 1-3, 1-5. Other notable changes are the introduction of greater specificity
into some principles (see, for example, Principle 2 dealing with management of conflicts of interest
by institutional investors) and a new recommendation for institutional investors to disclose how they
voted on all proposals of their investee companies. Id. at Principles 5-3. It appears that the new
provision relating to disclosure of voting records is already having an impact. A recent survey of
ninety-six companies from the Nikkei Stock Average found that 67% of them saw a decline in “yes”
votes for proposals to appoint new senior managers. See Japan’s Corporate Governance Gets Some
Long Over-due Scrutiny, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (July 6, 2017), https://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/
20170706/On-the-Cover/Japan-s-corporate-governance-gets-some-long-overdue-scrutiny
[https://
perma.cc/4XCJ-QZJ3].
157. See JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66, at 4, 13; OSAKI, supra note 148, at 2–3.
158. The U.K. Stewardship Code applies equally to asset owners and asset managers. See U.K.
STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 2. However, see Howarth, supra note 127, for criticism of this
aspect of the U.K. Code in the light of the different roles and responsibilities of asset owners and asset
managers. Although Japan’s Stewardship Code also applies to both asset owners and asset managers,
it outlines different expectations for each group. See JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66; COUNSEL
OF EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 153.
159. See U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 2; JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66, at
3. The 2017 revisions to the Japanese Stewardship Code contain a new provision aimed specifically
at proxy advisors, which requires them, inter alia, to “dedicate sufficient management resources to
ensure sound judgement in the evaluation of companies.” See COUNSEL OF EXPERTS ON THE
STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 153, at Principle 5-5.
160. U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 1; JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66, at 2.
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responses to quite different policy problems. A central policy factor
underpinning the U.K. Stewardship Code was the need for effective risk
control in the post-crisis era.161 The Japanese version, however, was far
more focused on arresting declining profitability, unlocking value, and
increasing investor returns.162 Reflecting these goals, the mantras of
“sustainable growth” and “medium to long-term corporate value” recur
throughout the Japanese Code.163 Another difference relates to ESG issues.
Unlike the U.K. Code, the Japanese specifically refers to ESG as a relevant
factor for investors monitoring the companies in which they invest.164
The most significant differences between the two Codes, however,
relate to the issue of investor activism. First, the Codes take divergent
approaches to activism intensity. The kind of shareholder engagement
envisaged by the 2014 Japanese Stewardship Code is relatively gentle. For
example, the Code urges institutional investors to engage in “constructive
dialogue”165 with management, rather than intervention.166 In spite of this
consensus-style language in the Japanese Code, however, the clear
message of the Code is that there must be more active communication

161. WALKER REVIEW, supra note 56, at 6, 12, 24–25.
162. See Chie Aoyagi & Giovanni Ganelli, Unstash the Cash! Corporate Governance in Japan
(IMF Asia Pacific Department, Working Paper 14/140, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14140.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX56-S3SW]; Benes, supra note 133; Fujikawa &
Pfanner, supra note 152. There were also concerns about the passivity of institutional investors in
relation to the 2011–2012 Olympus accounting scandal. See Bruce E. Aronson, The Olympus Scandal
and Corporate Governance Reform: Can Japan Find a Middle Ground Between the Board Monitoring
Model and Management Model?, 30 PAC. BASIN L. REV. 93, 106–14 (2012); Corporate Governance
in Japan, supra note 136.
163. See generally JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66. For example, “stewardship
responsibilities” are defined in the code to refer to “the responsibilities of institutional investors to
enhance the medium- to long-term investment return for their clients and beneficiaries.” Id. at 1. The
code also includes Principle 7 (which has no complement in the U.K. code), stating that
[t]o contribute positively to the sustainable growth of investee companies,
institutional investors should have in-depth knowledge of the investee
companies and their business environment and skills and resources needed to
appropropriately engage with the companies and make proper judgments in
fulfilling their stewardship activities.
Id. at 6, 13; see also COUNSEL OF EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 153, Principle 42.
164. See JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66, at 9. Whereas Japan’s 2014 Stewardship Code
refers to “risks arising from social and environmental matters”, this wording has been changed in the
2017 revisions to “risks and opportunities arising from social and environmental matters” [emphasis
added]. See COUNCIL OF EXPERTS ON JAPAN’S STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 153, at 12.
165. The reference to “constructive dialogue” is replicated throughout Japan’s Corporate
Governance Code. See JPX TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 136.
166. JAPAN STEWARDSHIP, supra note 66, at 10. The Japanese Stewardship Code did, however,
contemplate that institutional investors might wish to exchange views with other shareholders. Id. at
13.
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between the board and shareholders,167 and an end to the “quiet-life
equilibrium”168 of many Japanese companies.169
The U.K. Stewardship Code, on the other hand, is far less ambiguous
in its approach to activism intensity. It provides a clear framework for the
escalation of activist conduct, if the board of directors is unresponsive to
shareholder concerns. The U.K. Code states that institutional investors
should establish guidelines as to “when and how” they will intensify
pressure on management. Principle 4 of the Code lists various escalating
actions that institutional investors might use. These include expressing
their concerns at additional meetings with management or through the
company’s advisers; making public statements prior to shareholder
meetings; and requisitioning shareholder meetings to remove directors
from office.170 Shareholders have statutorily entrenched rights under U.K.
corporate law to convene meetings,171 as well as an absolute right to
remove directors from office at any time.172
In the U.S. context, the tone used in the new ISG stewardship
principles173 falls somewhere between the Japanese and U.K. approaches.
At first sight, the ISG stewardship principles appear to be close to the
Japanese model, adopting consensus-style language, which urges
institutional investors to attempt to resolve differences with management
in a “constructive and pragmatic manner.”174 Yet, the stewardship
principles also foreshadow stronger action by investors, à la the U.K.
model, if management is unresponsive to their concerns.175 The ISG
stewardship principles, particularly in combination with the
complementary ISG corporate governance principles,176 clearly indicate
that constructive and pragmatic engagement will have its limits.

167. Eguchi & Shishido, supra note 146, at 564.
168. Id. See generally Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life?
Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1047 (2003).
169. Eguchi & Shishido, supra note 146, at 559, 564. See Attracta Mooney, Japanese Asset
Managers Will Reveal AGM Votes, FIN. TIMES (June 4, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/
478ad316-4782-11e7-8d27-59b4dd6296b8.
170. U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 8.
171. See Companies Act, 2006 c. 46, §§ 303–305 (U.K.).
172. See id. § 168(1) (U.K.).
173. ISG STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 97.
174. Id. Principle E (“Institutional investors should address and attempt to resolve differences
with companies in a constructive and pragmatic manner.”). Principle E.2 (“Institutional investors
should engage with companies in a manner that is intended to build a foundation of trust and common
understanding.”).
175. See id. Principle E.4 (“Institutional investors should disclose, in general, what further
actions they may take in the event they are dissatisfied with the outcome of their engagement efforts.”).
176. ISG CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 98.
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A second major difference between the Codes relates to collective
activism. Consistent with its consensus-style approach to shareholder
engagement, the 2014 Japanese Stewardship Code contains no principle
endorsing collective activism, although the Code’s 2017 revisions now
contemplate at least some form of collaborative engagement between
institutional investors.177 In contrast, several principles in the U.K.
Stewardship Code refer to, and implicitly support, collective activism by
institutional investors. For example, one of the enumerated ways in which
investors can increase pressure on management under Principle 4 is by
“intervening jointly with other institutions on particular issues.”178
Principle 5 states further that “[i]nstitutional investors should be willing to
act collectively with other investors where appropriate.”179 In fact,
institutional investors in the United Kingdom have a long history of
engaging in coordinated action, not only to influence management of
investee companies directly, but also to influence the setting of legal rules
that determine the balance of power between shareholders and
management.180 The Financial Reporting Council has also encouraged
greater collaboration between international and U.K.-based institutional
investors, possibly as an antidote to the low level of equity held by
domestic institutional investors.181 This suggests a form of “transnational
agency capitalism,” where global institutional investors may be willing to
follow the lead, and join forces with, more aggressive local investors.182
In the United States, the ISG’s new stewardship principles are more
tentative and ambiguous than the U.K. Stewardship Code. Although the
new ISG stewardship principles refer to collaboration between
177. See COUNSEL OF EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 153, at 13. A newlyintroduced Principle 4-4 states that “[i]n addition to institutional investors engaging with investee
companies independently, it would be beneficial for them to engage with investee companies in
collaboration with other institutional investors (collective engagement) as necessary.” Id.
178. U.K. STEWARDSHIP 2012, supra note 57, at 8.
179. Id.
180. See Davies, supra note 12, at 355.
181. See, e.g., FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2013:
THE IMPACT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STEWARDSHIP
CODES 23 (Dec. 2013), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/9b72fe39-dabd-46ec-9692973e6ed6c033/Developments-in-Corporate-Governance-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/53V6-5CM9];
see also Cheffins, supra note 119; Davies, supra note 12, at 356.
182. On the implications of agency capitalism generally, see Gilson & Gordon, supra note 15;
Ruth Sullivan, Traditional Investors Adopt Harder Line: The Big Picture, FIN. TIMES (May 6, 2013),
https://www.ft.com/content/62d5ea16-b253-11e2-a388-00144feabdc0. A good example of what
might be termed “transnational agency capitalism” occurred in Taiwan in 2012, where a group of
domestic investors appealed to international fund managers to help them remove Chen Chin-jing,
chairman of China Petrochemical Development Corporation, from office. See Robin Kwong, Taiwan
Investors Try to Unseat Chairman, FIN. TIMES (May 7, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/
d4d3a330-9812-11e1-ad3e-00144feabdc0?mhq5j=e6.
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institutional investors, this collaboration appears to be directed at
encouraging the adoption and implementation of corporate
governance/stewardship principles, rather than engaging in collective
activism per se.183
One of the regulatory implications of collective activism is that it
may create a tension between corporate governance principles and
takeover rules. Many jurisdictions restrict shareholders from “acting in
concert” under their respective takeover regimes.184 Some regulators have
sought to defuse this tension by favoring coordinated shareholder
conduct185 over takeover rules.186 Other regulators have attempted the
difficult task of differentiating between “good” and “bad” collective
activism, with the aim of encouraging the former and deterring the latter
control-seeking type of activism.187 In the United States, however, former
SEC Chair Mary Jo White considered that regulators should take an
agnostic stance on whether particular activists, and activist campaigns, are
“good” or “bad.” Instead, she asserted that the role of regulators should
merely be to ensure that shareholders have sufficient information and that
“all play by the rules.”188 Yet another regulatory approach is to equate
long-term corporate commitment with “good” activism and, on that basis,
restrict the legal rights of short-term shareholders. The SEC’s ill-fated

183. See ISG STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 97, Principle F.
184. Eguchi & Shishido, supra note 146, at 565.
185. See, e.g., EUROPEAN SECS. & MKTS. AUTH., PUBLIC STATEMENT, INFORMATION ON
SHAREHOLDER COOPERATION AND ACTING IN CONCERT UNDER THE TAKEOVER BIDS DIRECTIVE –
1ST DIRECTIVE (June 20, 2014), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2014677.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5W3-VFRC]. European Securities and Markets Authority’s (ESMA)
public statement adopts a broad interpretation of the ways in which shareholders may wish to
cooperate. It states, for example, that shareholder cooperation can include discussion of matters to be
raised with the board, making representations to the board, and tabling or voting together on
resolutions. It also acknowledges that shareholders may want to engage cooperatively in relation to a
wide range of issues, including board composition, directors’ remuneration, and corporate social
responsibility. Id. at 3.1.
186. ESMA’s public statement articulates the clear policy position that European national
takeover rules “should not be applied in such a way as to inhibit such cooperation.” Id. at 3.2. It also
provides a “White List” of shareholder activities. Id. at 1.5, 4. According to ESMA, when shareholders
cooperate to engage in any activities specified in the White List, “that cooperation will not, in and of
itself, lead to a conclusion that the shareholders are acting in concert.” Id. at 4.1.
187. For example, Australia’s business conduct regulator, the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC), has made such an attempt. See AUSTL. SECS. & INV. COMM’N,
REGULATORY GUIDE 128 COLLECTIVE ACTION BY INVESTORS (2015), http://download.asic.gov.au/
media/3273670/rg128-published-23-june-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VNY-FQV4].
188. Mary J. White, Chair, SEC, Speech, A Few Observations on Shareholders in 2015, at 2
(Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/observations-on-shareholders-2015.html [https://
perma.cc/VPP9-3ZZ5].
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attempt to introduce a proxy access rule189 provided an example of the use
of shareholding periods as a filtering device to determine which
shareholders be accorded participatory rights in corporate governance.
The requirement of a three-year holding was a direct response to concerns
that the proxy access rule might be used by short-term (aka “bad”)
activists.190 The SEC stated that it believed this holding period requirement
“reflects our goal of limiting use of the rule to significant long-term
holders.”191
CONCLUSION
There is a Manichean divide in international corporate governance
today when it comes to shareholder engagement and activism. These
positive and negative narratives of shareholder influence have important
regulatory consequences.
The idea that activist shareholders are short-termist and that activism
is dangerous to corporations and society as a whole is a powerful theme in
contemporary U.S. corporate law literature. Some of the regulatory
implications of this model are that shareholders’ participatory rights in
corporate governance should be limited, and that an important goal of
corporate law is to protect the corporation from certain investors.
However, a very different paradigm is emerging in many other
countries. In these jurisdictions, shareholder participation is actively
encouraged, with institutional investors viewed as a central accountability
mechanism and as integral to long-term sustainable corporate profitability.
Far from being treated as part of the problem, institutional investors and
shareholder activism are increasingly viewed as part of the solution.
The recent proliferation of stewardship codes reflects this emerging
paradigm. This trend signals the growing importance of institutional
investors in a globalized investment world. Stewardship codes have come
late to the United States, in the form of the 2017 ISG stewardship
principles, but they have not arrived in a vacuum. These codes are part of
a sustained international push for greater investor involvement in
corporate governance. They also exemplify the increasing globalization of
corporate governance itself, which will inevitably result in calls for
stronger shareholder participation rights and higher levels of investor
engagement in the United States.

189. See James D. Cox & Benjamin J. C. Baucom, The Emperor has No Clothes: Confronting
the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811 (2012).
190. See SEC, Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668,
56,697-98 (Sept. 16, 2010); Bebchuk et al., supra note 19, at 1088.
191.75 Fed. Reg. at 56,698.

